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Paolo G. Carozza and Daniel Philpott

The Catholic Church, Human
Rights, and Democracy
Convergence and Conflict
with the Modern State
In Pope Benedict XVI’s address to the Roman Curia of December
22, 2006, he made reference to the Catholic Church’s own journey
toward embracing human rights and religious freedom.1 Perhaps
surprisingly to some, he gave credit for this development to the Enlightenment, which he said could count human rights and religious
freedom as its “true conquests.” More predictably to most, he reiterated his longstanding criticism of the Enlightenment’s attempt to
ground these principles on positivist and skeptical foundations. He
argued rather that a constructive synergy of faith and reason was the
best foundation for tolerance, human rights, and the preservation
of religious freedom.
Benedict’s thesis points to an ambivalent historical relationship
between the social teachings of the Catholic Church and modern
political institutions based on human rights and democracy. It is in
part a story of convergence. Gradually, over the course of the twentieth century, then far more rapidly beginning with the Second Vatican Council, following upon several centuries of consistent resistance to the momentum of European politics, the Church came to
embrace norms of human rights and democracy reflective of those
l o g o s 15:3 s u m m e r 2012
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that appeared in international instruments like the UN Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the constitutions of western democracies. As the term convergence—rather
than accommodation or adaptation—suggests, the Church did not
simply conform itself to what others had long before pioneered.
True, as Benedict argues, a dialogue with the Enlightenment did
beget Catholic evolution in certain dimensions of rights, especially
religious freedom. But it is also the case, as we point out below, that
the Church has articulated a tradition of rights since as early as the
sixteenth century. For its own part, the state and the “international
society” of states had to evolve, too. The sovereign states system
signified by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 clearly evaded the accountability that human rights and democracy demand. The French
Revolution and its liberal republican legatees in Europe and Latin
America propounded a portfolio of rights, to be sure, but with
prominent lacunae, particularly in the case of the religious freedom
of the Catholic Church. Indeed, the Church’s own willingness to
embrace religious freedom at Vatican II arose in part from the assurance that post–World War II Western European democracies as
well as the US Constitution provided that the Church could be free
under a liberal democratic constitution.
But the long rapprochement between the Church and modern
norms of human rights and democracy is neither complete nor uncontested. After Vatican II, tensions between the Church and modern states and international institutions did not disappear; ongoing
clashes included the Church’s complex confrontation with authoritarian states and its fracases with democracies over abortion, divorce, fetal research, euthanasia, war, and other issues, with the UN
overpopulation policy, and with the European Union over Europe’s
Christian identity and its policies on the family and sexuality.
This article argues that the Catholic Church’s relationship to human rights and democracy in the modern world can only be understood through both of the above dynamics: a historical convergence
and the persistence of tension. The first half of the article argues for
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this dual theme in the doctrines of the Church, where today, as over
the past several centuries, the Catholic conception of the common
good yields both an embrace of human rights and democracy and a
critique of their secular espousal. The second half of the article focuses on practice, showing how the Church’s efforts to advance its
teachings on human rights and democracy sometimes succeed and
sometimes encounter resistance, both on account of conceptual differences with modern states and international organizations as well
as problems rooted in institutional realities. Doctrine and practice
are not hermetically separable, but they are distinct enough for our
analysis. Both realms, we argue, manifest historical convergence as
well as ongoing ambivalence.

I. Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Democracy in the Teaching
of the Church
A systematic theoretical foundation for both international law and
universal human rights emerged in Catholic thought at least as early
as the sixteenth century in the work of Francisco de Vitoria and
his contemporaries in Salamanca, Spain. The classical natural law
account characteristic of the Catholic intellectual tradition has consistently understood the paradigmatic definition of law to be tied to
the good of the human person through law’s proper orientation to
the common good.2 Out of his deep reflections on the Spanish encounter with the peoples of the New World, Vitoria expanded the
Thomistic notion of the common good to incorporate into it the ius
gentium, the law of nations. Vitoria analogized the whole world to a
single commonwealth, in which all of the human family shares in a
single common good.3 Synthesizing the juridical concepts of rights
drawn from the canon law with the philosophical tradition of natural law, Vitoria and his followers also vigorously and systematically
defended the rights of the American Indians to ownership of their
lands, to equality, and to sovereignty, principally on the basis that
the natural rights of the Indians were grounded in their creation
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as rational beings in God’s image.4 The School of Salamanca thus
represents an early and lucid example of Catholic human rights discourse. Confirmed by the papal magisterium in multiple instances,
these doctrines regarding the unity of the human family and the
rights of all of God’s children were not at all on the fringe of the
teaching of the Church as a whole.5
As these nascent ideas of international law and natural rights
developed over the ensuing centuries, they differed in certain critical ways, in root and branch, from those notions of international
legal order and human rights that came to dominate political and
legal thought in the modern era. With respect to international law,
the Westphalian system that emerged from the mid–seventeenth
century onward was premised on the sovereignty of the territorial state. This was understood by many to contradict the Catholic
Church’s traditional teaching that political authority came “from
God alone”6 (and indirectly, therefore, from the universal temporal
authority of the Church itself). Pope Innocent X, for example, condemned the treaties of Westphalia as “null, void, invalid, iniquitous,
unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect
for all time.”7 As territorial sovereignty gave rise to legal nationalism and positivism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
gap widened between the traditional Catholic understanding of
the law of nations, grounded in the responsibility of rulers for the
universal common good, and secularized international law, increasingly grounded in sovereign autonomy and consent.
Similarly, from the perspective of the classical natural law tradition, the natural rights theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau shared a common reduction of the ends of human life and of
politics. Understanding man as naturally solitary and antagonistic,
they conceived of rights as emerging primarily from the instinct
for physical self-preservation and need for security. At its core, this
view diverged dramatically from the preexisting Catholic conception of rights as expressions of the human unity and dignity that
flow from being created in the likeness of God.
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The contrast between the two traditions came to the fore concretely with the French Revolution and the nineteenth century
conflict between the Church and modern European liberalism. Although it advanced various “Rights of Man,” the French Revolution
also sharply attacked the authority of the Church, requiring priests
to sign an oath of loyalty and taking the lives of many who refused.8
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Revolution’s
anticlericalism lived on in liberal republican movements in Western Europe and Latin America, as well as in German Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck’s Kulturkampf and in international socialism, all
of which sought to truncate the Church’s rights, authority, and influence in civil society, especially in education.
Fueling this conflict from the other direction was the Church’s
own continued adherence to a theory of politics that it had developed in the Middle Ages, one holding that at least in countries
where Catholics constitute a majority of the population, Catholicism ought to be established as the religion of the realm while other
faiths ought to be restricted. The Church’s doctrines thus forbade
certain crucial aspects of liberalism, including religious freedom
and freedom of expression.9
For both of those reasons, in its struggle with modern European
states throughout the nineteenth century, the Church’s teachings on
natural rights were emphatically focused on the condemnation of
what the Church saw as the false premises of liberalism. The primary target of criticism was the view of man as fundamentally autonomous, naturally free in an absolute sense that denied human beings’
structural dependence on God and their intrinsically social nature.
This assertion of unqualified liberty, without regard to truth, was
seen to result in excessive individualism, in the privatization and
suppression of religion, and ultimately in the absolutism of the state
subject to no higher authority. Consistently, the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and specific rights such as freedom of the press
were condemned in magisterial pronouncements as manifestations
of what Pius VI called the “monstrous right” of absolute liberty.10

19

20

logos
Only with the papacy of Leo XIII in the late nineteenth century
do we see a greater convergence, or at least mutual engagement,
between Catholic principles of human rights and the ideas common
to secular political models. Like the other nineteenth century popes
before him, Leo XIII taught that a notion of rights severed from the
authority of God could confuse truth and falsehood and would ultimately place natural rights at the mercy of the changing whims of
human legislators. Unlike his immediate predecessors, however, he
went on to retrieve a different vocabulary of rights from within the
tradition of the Church. Leo XIII affirmed in particular the right to
marriage, the right to education, the right of association (especially associations of workers), the right to private property, and “the
right of procuring the things which sustain life.” He dealt with the
relationship of rights to the common good and of rights to duties,
and other systematic, foundational questions of human rights.11 Leo
XIII thus proposed a robust alternative to the liberal conception of
rights by renewing and adapting the tradition to the new material
conditions of mankind in the modern world.
In the context of totalitarian dictatorship and world war in the
1930s and 1940s, Popes Pius XI and Pius XII continued Leo’s affirmation of certain basic rights and stressed their grounding in the
dignity of the person.12 By 1948, Catholic teachings on rights were
well developed enough to exert an indirect but significant influence
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13
As with human rights, Leo XIII and his successors, especially
Benedict XV, the “peace Pope” of the World War I years,14 as well as
Pius XI and Pius XII, also opened the door to a greater acceptance
of the realities of the modern state and states system. With respect
to international law and institutions, Pius XII openly supported the
work of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the San Francisco
conference that created the United Nations.15 Again, as with human
rights, however, this endorsement was rooted in the Church’s longstanding teachings about the universal common good, not in the
idea of absolute, autonomous sovereignty.16
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By contrast, the Church’s judgment of democracy was far more
uncertain. Prior to the twilight of the nineteenth century, popes
spoke about democracy rarely and usually vitriolically, linking it to
liberalism and socialism.17 Then, paralleling his development of the
ideas of human rights and international society, Leo XIII began to
discuss democracy more favorably, though still qualifiedly. Affirming that the Church is in principle neutral with respect to regime
structure, he allowed that a majority might choose who will exercise authority for the common good, but stressed, importantly, that
“this choice decides who will be sovereign but does not confer the
rights of sovereignty. The authority is not constituted [by the majority’s choice]; rather, it is decided who will exercise it.”18 In the
mid–twentieth century, Pius XII endorsed democracy even more
positively, but with similar reservations. In his 1944 Christmas
message, he, too, abstained from sacralizing one particular form
of regime, but condemned state absolutism, blaming it for the aggression and corruption that engulfed the world in war, and spoke
favorably of the strengthened spirit of democratic freedom and participation that was to emerge after the war’s end. He even declared
democratic government “a postulate of nature imposed by reason
itself.” A contradiction to the claim that no one regime form is enduringly valid? Only when considered apart from his praise for “the
democratic ideal of liberty and equality,” thus linking democracy to
what popes have indeed taught is enduringly valid: human rights.19
Like popes before and after him, though, he continued to insist that
even democratic rule derives its authority from its orientation to
the common good and that it can lose its authority insofar as it becomes “the arbitrariness of the mass.”
The same combination of commitments—support for international institutions, skepticism of absolute sovereignty, and human
rights and democracy insofar as they instantiate the Church’s notion
of the common good—redounded in the Church’s contemporaneous support for another, innovative form of institution: European
federation, launched initially as the European Coal and Steel Com-
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munity with the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The founding fathers of
the union were predominantly devout Catholics, including France’s
Robert Schuman and (to a lesser extent) Jean Monnet,20 Italy’s Alcide de Gasperi, and Germany’s Konrad Adenauer; the f ederation’s
most supportive political parties were (mostly) Catholic-inspired
Christian Democratic ones; and Pope Pius XII supported this
founding enthusiastically. Precisely the political morality that we
have been discussing explains this support. The nascent European
federation represented a resurrection of the Church’s medieval
vision of a morally and politically united European civilization,
though now updated with modern notions of human rights and democracy. Through these institutions, shortly to become the European Economic Community and decades later the European Union,
Westphalia was reversed. Over the course of its history, European
integration consistently garnered its strongest support from Christian Democratic parties and disproportionately strong support
from Catholic voters.21
In the following decade, Pope John XXIII continued and expanded the Church’s commitments to human rights, democracy, and
international institutions even while vigilantly stressing differences
between Catholic and secular understandings of these ideals. In his
1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris,22 he praised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “an act of the highest importance.” Drawing
on the Catholic natural law tradition, he affirmed among the universal and inviolable rights of every person not only such rights as life,
property, association, and education—rights recognizable by classic
liberal theory—but also the right to follow one’s conscience in honoring God, the right to work suited to one’s capacities, and the right
to form and belong to intermediate groups in society. John departed
even more strikingly from parallel, secular human rights ideas by
identifying the true and ultimate aim of human rights to be the formation of our relationship with God and our destiny in beatitude, as
opposed to the illusion of an “autonomous self.” By contrast, he did
not develop as clearly the Church’s teaching on democracy.
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For international bodies, especially the United Nations, John lent
a stronger papal endorsement than any previous pope. In light of
increasing interdependence and growing association among human
communities, “no state can fittingly pursue its own interests in isolation from the rest,” he averred. Observing that “the unity of the human family . . . consists of men who are all equal by virtue of their
natural dignity,” he gave strong support to the creation and maintenance of international structures with responsibility for the “universal common good; the good, that is, of the whole human family.”
In the contemporaneous documents of Vatican II (1962–65) one
can find a similar approach to human rights and modern political
systems. The Council’s single most important departure from the
Church’s earlier, medieval model of political authority was Dignitatis Humanae, which declared religious liberty a basic right rooted
in the God-given dignity of the person—a right meant to protect
both the practice of other faiths as well as the Church’s own rights
in settings where it was threatened.23
The Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, did not refer to “democracy” as such,
but rejected despotic governments, affirmed the freedom of people
to choose their type of government and their leaders, and appealed
to the importance of political participation, which in turn it said
required the rule of law and separation of powers.24 True to tradition, the document endorsed human rights far more strongly and
explicitly. By that time, though, the political landscape of the world
meant that to endorse human rights was effectively to endorse democracy since human rights were realized most effectively in states
with democratic constitutions.25 Finally, Gaudium et Spes continued
and extended the Catholic tradition of viewing the common good
as worldwide in scope, and stressed repeatedly that international
solidarity, coordination, institutions, and law are necessary to secure peace, development, and human rights.
In his own encyclicals, Paul VI embraced the call for international solidarity to secure justice and rights, extending it in a par-
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ticular way to questions of concern to the poorer regions of the
world and to the problem of economic development.26 It is worth
noting also that his encyclical on the eightieth anniversary of Leo
XIII’s Rerum Novarum appeared to depart from the Church’s earlier, formally neutral stance with respect to forms of government,
and instead argued that “to counterbalance increasing technocracy,
modern forms of democracy must be devised, not only making it
possible for each man to become informed and to express himself,
but also by involving him in a shared responsibility.”27
An even fuller integration of human rights, democracy, and
international solidarity under the rule of law would take place in
the extensive writings of Blessed John Paul II. He gave the idea of
human rights an unprecedented breadth and centrality in Catholic
social teaching, from his first encyclical, which expressed the hope
that “human rights will become throughout the world a fundamental principle of work for man’s welfare,” to his last addresses.28 In his
speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, for example,
John Paul remarked that “there are indeed universal human rights,
rooted in the nature of the person, rights which reflect the objective
and inviolable demands of a universal moral law,” and he described
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “one of the
highest expressions of the human conscience of our time.”29
And yet John Paul’s reflections on human rights also preserved
and even heightened a tension that we have been tracing throughout
this brief history. He criticized severely certain claims for rights
that are grounded in radically different understandings of human
anthropology. In Evangelium Vitae, for example, he decried modern
culture’s tendency to characterize crimes against life as exercises
of human rights.30 “How can we reconcile these declarations [of
human rights] with the refusal to accept those who are weak and
needy, or elderly, or those who have just been conceived?” he asked.
“These attacks . . . represent a direct threat to the entire culture
of human rights. It is a threat capable, in the end, of jeopardizing
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the very meaning of democratic coexistence.” This contradiction is
not new. Although John Paul is addressing a different set of social
circumstances, his ambivalence toward human rights in the modern
state arises out of the same understandings of the origin and ends
of human life that have historically characterized Catholic thought
on natural rights.
In that same 1995 UN address in which he lauded the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, John Paul called for an equal attention to and respect for the “rights of nations” in the international
order, “which are nothing but ‘human rights’ fostered at the specific
level of community life,” but he takes great care to note that this
does not necessarily entail state sovereignty for every people, nor
does it limit the duties of international responsibility. Indeed, global
solidarity and the universal common good were central themes in
his social teachings.31
Whereas John Paul’s teachings on human rights and solidarity
were notably forceful and pervasive, it was with respect to
democracy that he broke a great deal of new ground. No longer
invoking at all the traditional neutrality of the Church with respect
to political systems, in his 1987 encyclical, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, he
affirmatively and clearly called for democracy (in which he included
by definition the rule of law and respect for human rights) as the
best alternative to corruption and authoritarianism. Several years
later, in his 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus, John Paul II stated a
preference for democratic systems forcefully: “The Church values
the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of
citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed
the possibility both of electing and holding accountable those who
govern them, and of replacing them through peaceful means when
appropriate.”32
It was not merely a formal or procedural view of democracy
that John Paul endorsed. He spoke of “authentic” democracy as one
that guarantees human rights, respects the rule of law, and ensures
the common good. In particular, democracies must respect genuine
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human values. “A democracy without values easily turns into open
or thinly disguised totalitarianism,” he warned, noting that “even
in countries with democratic forms of government, these rights
are not always fully respected.” 33 The ultimate “synthesis of these
rights” is religious freedom, “understood as the right to live in the
truth of one’s faith and in conformity with one’s transcendent dignity as a person.” Thus, he emphasized from the beginning of his
pontificate that “religious freedom is simply one facet of the single
prism of freedom, which is an essential constitutive element of an
authentically modern and democratic society. This means that . . .
a State cannot claim to be ‘democratic’ if it opposes religious freedom in any way whatsoever.”34
In sum, we can see in four centuries of Catholic thought on human rights, the rule of law, state sovereignty, and democracy both
an essential continuity as well as profound doctrinal and philosophical developments, especially in the last century and most of all after
Vatican II.35 We can see, too, both the convergence and the abiding
tensions between Catholic thought and the norms that are found in
domestic and international law and institutions.
A concise synthesis of both themes and their application to two
salient issues of global law and politics today can be found in Pope
Benedict XVI’s address to the United Nations in April 2008.36 Benedict first noted that the objectives of the United Nations represent an
important part of the common good of the human family and reiterates the Church’s call for a “greater degree of international ordering.”
The basis for this endorsement, however, is clearly the universal responsibility for the common good. Citing Vitoria, Benedict affirmed
the unity of the human family and derived from it a responsibility
on the part of states to protect their own and others’ populations
from grave violations of human rights and from humanitarian crises.
The “responsibility to protect” is a controversial idea in international
law and politics today, criticized for being at odds with the sovereign equality and autonomy of states or with a legalistic formalism
that insists that nations may use military force only in self-defense
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or with the UN Security Council’s prior authorization. Benedict’s
clear affirmation of the legitimacy of the “responsibility to protect”
is consistent with a tradition that sees the common good, rather than
sovereignty, as the foundation of political authority. Such intervention “should never be interpreted as an unwarranted imposition or a
limitation on sovereignty,” he made clear.
His treatment of a second issue, human rights, revealed even
more acutely the Catholic Church’s simultaneous convergence and
persistent difference with prevailing secular conceptions and practices. Celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Benedict affirmed that “human rights are
increasingly being presented as the common language and the ethical substratum of international relations,” and he asserted that “the
universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights all
serve as guarantees safeguarding human dignity.” He quickly added,
however, that the only genuine foundation for human rights is the
natural law “inscribed on human hearts and present in different cultures and civilizations,” and that human rights must be understood
to be “measures of the common good.” The common good that
rights help accomplish, he warned, will not be achieved through
correct procedures or the formalities of legality, but requires that
rights remain rooted in “unchanging justice” and “the unity of the
human person,” rather than in positivistic or utilitarian conceptions
of law and society. The most important guarantor that human rights
are indeed oriented toward the integrity of the human person in
all of its factors is the respect for religious freedom, “understood
as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian—a vision that brings out the unity of the person while
clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that
of the believer.”
Benedict concluded these reflections with a point drawn from
his own encyclical, Spe Salvi, that “every generation has the task of
engaging anew in the arduous search for the right way to order human affairs.”37 Church teachings in these areas are to be read and
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practiced with attentiveness to concrete realities, through the exercise of prudence and practical reason, and cannot be considered
merely as abstract doctrines. This brings us to the second portion
of our article: a consideration of the Church’s practical experience
of advancing norms of human rights and democracy once it had
embraced them clearly in the latter twentieth century.

II. Convergence and Conflict in Practice38
Here again, we find ambivalence. The Church’s convergence with
liberal norms found in democratic states and international institutions formed an efficacious synergy insofar as it enabled it to take
up opposition to and to collaborate closely with other secular actors
in opposing regimes that cruelly violated these norms: communist
regimes, right-wing military dictatorships, and sui generis violators
like South Africa’s apartheid regime. But the Church also encountered tensions in its advancement of these norms. Some of these
arose in the Church’s confrontation with authoritarian regimes, in
which some national churches were resistant to the new teaching or
were too dominated by dictatorships to voice them. Other tensions
surfaced in the Church’s relationship to democracies, both longstanding and newly established ones, and to international institutions like the European Union and the United Nations. These emanated from differences like the ones described above between the
Church’s interpretation of human rights and democracy, derived
from its own conception of the common good, and interpretations
articulated and practiced in the constitutions and policies of states
and international institutions.
The Church’s endorsement of human rights and democracy at
Vatican II proved to be a powerful motor of change in the latter
decades of the twentieth century. One of the most significant global
trends of this period was what political scientist Samuel Huntington has called the “Third Wave” of democratization—a wave of
some eighty countries that made a transition from authoritarian-
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ism to democracy.39 Observing the transitions between 1974 and
1990, Huntington found that roughly three quarters of these were
majority Catholic in their populations. The Third Wave was “overwhelmingly a Catholic Wave,” he wrote. Beginning in Portugal and
Spain in the 1970s, spreading across Latin America and the Philippines in the 1980s, the Catholic Wave peaked in Poland in 1989,
sparking the spate of Eastern European revolutions against communist rule. After the end of the Cold War, the wave continued in
settings like East Timor and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004.
The Church’s new teachings were arguably an important cause
of the Catholic Wave of democratization. They demonstrably led national Catholic churches, often in alliance with the Vatican, to defy
communists and caudillos, a defiance that, combined with other
factors, led to transitions to democracy. Leaders and laity protested
publicly through statements and demonstrations; they organized in
underground cells; they celebrated masses and other liturgies with
a partly political intent; they joined forces with unions, parties,
journalists, and non-governmental organizations within and outside of national borders; and they sometimes evoked the Church’s
historical place in a country’s national identity so as to delegitimize
regimes that oppressed it.
Through such defiance, the Church’s convergence with the organizing principles of the modern liberal state became a potent force
for justice. Yet, the transmission of Vatican teachings to national
settings has not been universally smooth. Whereas some national
churches opposed dictatorships inspiringly and memorably, others
remained cozy with autocrats or stunted in their defiance. A brief
global survey of the Catholic Wave reveals this variation.
In Europe, two forms of Catholic opposition corresponded
to two different forms of dictatorship. In Portugal and Spain, the
Church became a force for democracy by withdrawing its support
for military dictatorships that it had helped to legitimize for several decades, most vividly that of Spain’s Generalissimo Francisco
Franco. Its authoritarian opponents in Eastern Europe were com-
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munist regimes that exercised dictatorial control over the governance and practice of churches. These regimes the Church opposed
as a dissident, most memorably in Poland, where it was supported
by its charismatic native son, John Paul. Church opposition was also
strong in Lithuania, but was comparatively moderate in Czechoslovakia and weak in Hungary.
In Latin America, the Church had once been an integral partner
to colonial states but eventually became disestablished in virtually
every state on the continent in the nineteenth or early twentieth
century.40 When most of Central and South America came (or persisted) under the control of military dictatorships in the 1960s and
1970s, some national Catholic churches became powerful voices of
opposition and contributors to the wave of democratization that occurred in the 1980s: in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and in Mexico, where it was an anti-clerical leftist autocracy that the Church faced. Other churches, however, in Argentina,
Paraguay, and Uruguay, remained closely allied with dictatorships
and did little to support these countries’ transitions to democracy
in the 1980s.
A similar pattern of opposition to a government with which the
Church was once a partner occurred in the Philippines, where the
Church helped to lead the “people power” protests that overthrew
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Elsewhere in Asia, the Church was also a
strong democratizer: in South Korea, it joined Protestant Churches
in mounting public protests against the dictatorship of President
Park Chung Hee; in East Timor, a Church that was once a partner
to the colonial Portuguese state became, under the leadership of
Bishop Carolos Ximenes Belo, a key leader in the struggle for independence from Indonesia and the establishment of democracy.
Finally, Africa also provides rich examples of both strong and
weak democratizers among Catholic churches. In Malawi, for instance, the 1992 national pastoral letter of that country’s bishops,
“Living Our Faith,” leveled public criticism at the one-party dictatorship of Hastings Banda and became pivotal in his downfall.
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Catholic churches in Kenya, Congo, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia were likewise instrumental for
democratization. In Uganda and Rwanda, by contrast, the Church
was collaborationist or febrile; some Rwandan clerics were even
implicated as perpetrators in the genocide of 1994.
What explains these differences? We propose two factors that
enabled or hindered the Church’s advancement of its teachings of
human rights and democracy and that account in good part for why
the Church in Rome’s convergence with norm of human rights and
democracy was strong in some locales but weak in others.
The first may be thought of as “political theology,” the set of ideas
that any religious person or organization holds about legitimate political authority. The strongest democratizers were those national
churches in which the political theology of the Church’s teachings
on human rights and democracy was held most widely and deeply among all of its members, but especially its bishops. In some
churches, such as in Chile and Brazil, these ideas had taken root and
spread even prior to the Council and were then empowered by it.
The second explanatory factor, coined “differentiation” by sociologists of religion, describes the degree of mutual autonomy
between churches and states in their basic legal authority. “Differentiated” church-state relationships are ones in which churches are
not established, remain unrestricted in their governance and practice, and do not themselves hold standing prerogatives in the state.
By contrast, undifferentiated or “integrated” relationships are ones
characterized by low autonomy in all of these dimensions. The most
effective democratizers were churches acting from a high level of
differentiation from the state, ones that neither collaborated closely with nor were altogether suppressed by authoritarian regimes.
Their differentiated position provided what George Weigel has
called “moral extraterritoriality,” an island redoubt of free thought
and speech from which it could speak and organize in opposition.41
Through four different sequential patterns, political theology
and differentiation shaped national churches’ pursuit of democra-
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tization. The first consists of countries were the Church had been
institutionally differentiated from the state for several decades prior to Vatican II. At some later point, a liberal democratic political theology characteristic of the Council rose and spread through
its ranks and led it to become a democratizer. This pattern may be
summarized as differentiation then ideas. Its best exemplar is the
Polish Catholic Church, whose differentiation from the state dates
back to its period of partition between 1795 and 1918 and persisted through communist rule after World War II. Following the
Council, the Polish Church became an advocate not just of its own
autonomy but of the principles of human rights and democracy,
themes that John Paul strongly resounded.42 The geographically
proximate Lithuanian and Ukrainian Catholic Churches fit this pattern as well, as does the South Korean Church. The same pattern
obtains in Latin America, where virtually all national churches were
disestablished—and institutionally differentiated—by 1925, many
of whom hosted a growth in liberal democratic political theology
at some later date, in all cases a growth that the Council greatly accelerated. The most ardent proponents of democracy were those
churches in which the new political theology became lodged earliest, widest, and deepest. It was the Brazilian church, where liberal
democratic ideas were held widest, that took up democratic opposition earliest and strongest—lay movements, base communities, and
a coalition (but not a unanimous one) of the nation’s bishops. Next
came the Chilean Church, where the new thinking also took hold
comparatively early, wide, and deep, and whose bishops, though
initially divided over General Augusto Pinochet’s rule, were united
against him by 1976. Churches in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Panama, Bolivia, and Guatemala became supporters of democracy
later, once liberal democratic ideas gained ground there.43
In a second pattern, national churches remained undifferentiated from their states right up to Vatican II, whose new thinking
then brought them to separate themselves from their states. The
sequence here was ideas then differentiation. By 1971, the bish-
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ops of the Spanish Church called for the separation of church and
state, asked clergy to step down from government positions, and
(in a majority vote) publicly repented for the Church’s role in the
civil war of the 1930s. Their opposition proved a major source of
democracy after the death of Franco in 1975. The democratization
of Portugal just prior to that of Spain was also encouraged by a
Catholic church where the Council’s political theology encouraged
a majority of bishops to withdraw their support from an authoritarian regime. In the Philippines, too, the Catholic Church that encouraged the overthrow of Marcos in 1986 under the leadership of
Jaime Cardinal Sin was one that had once been integrated with the
regime but then expanded its oppositional stance more and more
strongly as its members took on the teachings of the Council more
and more widely.44
A third pattern is one in which differentiation and new ideas
arose in a national church at roughly the same time and where it is
difficult to say how one influenced the other. It might be called ideas
and differentiation. Many opposition movements in Africa during
the 1980s and 1990s fit this description. Through episcopal pronouncements, politically charged religious ceremony, organization
and lobbying, the support of papal visits, and collaboration with
Protestant churches and political parties, national churches in Kenya, Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia opposed postcolonial authoritarian regimes. In all
of these cases, the Church’s agitation for democracy came after the
rise of institutional differentiation and the reception of the Council’s political theology of human rights and democracy.45
The fourth and final pattern involves those national churches that
never or only feebly opposed dictatorships. True to the argument,
these were far less autonomous from the state than the vigorous democratizers and contained far less support for liberal democratic political theology. The Czechoslovakian Catholic Church, which came
to oppose its own communist regime only in the mid-1980s and
much less energetically than did the Church in Poland and Lithu-
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ania, was also comparatively less independent in its governance, less
connected with opposition groups, and, at least in the Czech portion of the state, far more alienated from the loyalties of the nation, which bore memories of Habsburg suppression of separatism
during the Reformation era. Apart from the solitary opposition of
József Cardinal Mindszenty, the Catholic Church in Hungary resisted Communism even more feebly, and was even more dominated in
its governance and slow to accept Vatican II’s teachings. In Africa, the
churches that failed to pursue democracy strongly—those in Angola,
Cameroon, Uganda under the Museveni regime in 1986, and Rwanda—failed to achieve differentiation, remaining either dominated,
as was the Angolan Church under a Marxist regime, or strongly tied
to the regime, as was the Church in Rwanda, and espoused a neutral
political theology, open to supporting a wide variety of regimes.46
These negative examples, too, point to the political factors that assist
or hinder the Church’s promotion of its teachings on human rights
and democracy, the fruit of the convergence with the modern state
that took place progressively throughout the twentieth century.
In the years after Vatican II, the Church also manifested ambivalence in its relations with existing constitutional democracies, the
European Community/Union, and the United Nations. Its ambivalence here was more straightforward, emanating from the conceptual divergences with secularism described in the first part of
our article. In broad principle, the Church continued to support
strongly all of these institutions. After the revolutions of 1989, John
Paul continued to voice support for democracy—and democracies.
Though his support was global in its reach, above all he championed
his native Poland, seeing in this overwhelmingly Catholic nation a
potential model of a morally and spiritually well-grounded democracy. He also continued the tradition of papal support for European
federation, which took the form of the European Union in 1993.
He hoped that common European institutions would be the carriers
of a culturally united European civilization based on democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and the dignity of the person and the
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family, the same vision that he had wielded against communist governments in Eastern Europe.47 Finally, in numerous statements and
speeches, John Paul continued the papacy’s support for the United
Nations, both its traditional mission as well as new endeavors like
humanitarian intervention.
But if John Paul, other postconciliar popes, and most national
level bishops supported these forms of institutions and encouraged
them to manifest the common good that the Church taught, they
also at times found these institutions wanting in just this regard.
The Church criticized democracies in North and South America,
Europe, and Australasia most consistently and vociferously over
policies regarding abortion, divorce, euthanasia, stem cell research,
cloning, and same-sex unions. Though it often addressed itself to issues like war, immigration, and the security of the poor as well, its
statements, stratagems, and activism over the former set of issues
most vividly manifested the divergence between its own conception
of freedom, grounded in its teachings about the human person, and
a secular liberal freedom of self-definition and subjective autonomy.
Though this divergence played itself out in manifold political
settings, it is hard to find a better showcase for it than in post-
communist Poland. John Paul’s vision of Poland as a light for Europe, a similar vision held by Poland’s bishops—communist era
Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński had called Poland the “Christ of Nations”
for its redemptive role in European history—combined with the
prestige that the Church derived from its heroic opposition to communist rule, gave the Church both an interest in and influence for
promoting its conception of democracy on this particular turf.48 In
the early years after the fall of communism, then, the Polish Church
sought legal protection for the human person from the moment of
conception and religious education in the public schools; a concordat with the Vatican that guaranteed its right of internal governance
and strong prerogatives in education, marriage, and civil society
activities; and a constitution that explicitly referenced God and the
Church’s role in the nation’s history, that established God’s “exist-
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ing and unchangeable law” as the basis of the state and superior to
the constitution itself, that declared marriage to be between one
man and one woman and that avoided the language of separation
of church and state. But in this embryonic electoral democracy,
the Church encountered competition from parties whose social vision was more reminiscent of the western half of the continent,
the very region that the Church wanted Poland to influence and
evangelize. Opposition was especially fierce from 1993 to 1997
under the government of the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA), a
party that included former communist leaders and that sought to
liberalize abortion laws and opposed the terms of the concordat. In
the end, the Church’s efforts were partially successful. The bishops
were vexed that the final draft of the constitution did not contain
the language about God, God’s law, or the protection of human
life from the moment of conception that they had wanted. But the
document did contain a traditional definition of marriage, language
about the protection of life that the Constitutional Tribunal would
later leverage in 1997 to overturn a liberalized abortion law passed
by the DLA, several references to God, and an endorsement of the
concordat, which, signed in 1993 between Poland and the Holy
See, was itself quite favorable to the Church’s platform. Even in
a state where the Church is uniquely influential, then, it clashed
vigorously with partisans of a more secular conception of rights and
democracy, though not without victories.
Similar lines of contention configured debates between the
Church and the European Union in the early 2000s. Averring that
the Union is a promoter not just of a free market and efficient business transactions in a globalized world but also of a European cultural unity that is ultimately rooted in Christianity, the Church publicly took issue with the omission of Christianity in the preamble
to the draft constitution of the European Union in 2003. Far from
aiming to reestablish Catholicism as Europe’s religion, John Paul
argued that Christianity merited mention on account of its historic
contribution to democracy, human rights, religious freedom, the
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secular state, pluralism, and, in his words, “a melting pot of different cultures” on the European continent.49 But Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, former president of France and chairman of the drafting
committee for the EU Constitution, demurred, agreeing only to
the preambular mention of Europe’s religious heritage alongside
mentions of ancient Rome and Greece, the Enlightenment, and the
French Revolution.50 The Church also expressed opposition to a
trend toward endorsing same-sex unions in EU policies. The European Parliament reciprocated when it rejected the nomination
of Rocco Buttiglione, a Catholic Italian politician who adheres to
the Church’s teachings on sexuality, as European Commissioner
for Justice and Home Affairs. Perceiving this cultural momentum,
some right-wing Polish Catholics even opposed democratic Poland’s entry into the European Union, fearing the body’s influence
on Poland’s own politics. The consensus of Polish bishops, though,
supported Poland’s entry, hoping that the influence would run in
the other direction.
Finally, the Church has fought not a culture war, but certainly
some cultural battles, against the United Nations. It fought these,
again, on issues where the Church’s foundation for rights yielded
different conclusions than those of secularists.
At both the UN’s International Conference on Population and
Development in Cairo in 1994 and its Fourth World Conference
on Women in Beijing in 1995, the Church strongly affirmed the
meetings’ basic goals of economic development and the equality of
women but opposed abortion and artificial contraception as means
of birth control as well as denials of the dignity of women’s vocation to family and motherhood. As with disputes in the context of
democratic states and the European Union, the Church took issue
not with human rights and democracy themselves but with manifestations and interpretations that diverged from its own teachings.
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Conclusion
As Pope Benedict XVI’s December 2006 address to the Roman Curia suggests, the Catholic Church’s relationship to human rights and
democracy has long been ambivalent. The Church endorsed human
rights as early as its sixteenth century pronouncements on colonization in the New World and with accelerated force in its modern
encyclicals beginning in 1891. Through an extended dialogue with
the modern world, including proponents of the Enlightenment,
and through the parallel evolution of the state and international institutions, the Church’s teaching converged more and more with
the norms of human rights and democracies found in these secular
institutions. This convergence was consolidated at Vatican II. But
Vatican II did not dispel differences between Catholic and secular
articulations of human rights and democracy, either in theory or in
practice. In numerous (but far from all) instances, national Catholic
churches have come to oppose dictatorships in the very name of human rights and democracy. In the case of long established or newly
minted democracies, entirely new forms of divergence between the
Church’s teachings and democratic practice have arisen. Such divergence is likely to persist, even as the Church is likely to remain
enthusiastic about the core norms of constitutional democracies,
the European Union, and the United Nations.
Though the Church’s teaching has evolved—or, better yet, “developed,” to use the concept that John Henry Newman articulated
in the nineteenth century and that the Church embraced in the
twentieth—there is nevertheless continuity and consistency behind
the Church’s ambivalent stance toward human rights, democracy,
and the modern state. The common thread running through centuries of teaching and practice consists of the Church’s commitment to upholding the transcendent dignity of the human person
and affirming that the legitimacy of any political authority lies in its
accountability to the common good, understood as a moral order
grounded in this human dignity, rather than in state sovereignty or
even democracy as such.
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